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Cultural policy in Singapore: negotiating economic and socio-cultural
agendas
Lily Kong
Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, 1 Arts Link, Singapore 117570, Singapore
Abstract
In this paper, I examine the role of cultural policy in a newly industrialised economy, which is at the same time a state with a short
history and only nascent beginnings in nation-building and eorts to construct a distinctive cultural identity. Using Singapore as the
site of analyses, develop an understanding of the intersection between the economic and socio-cultural agendas behind cultural
development policies. I illustrate the hegemony of the economic, supported by the ideology and language of pragmatism and
globalisation. At the same time, I explore the reception of and attempts to negotiate (and at times, contest) state policies by ‘‘cultural
practitioners’’ – artists, dancers, playwrights, actors, directors and so forth, illustrating the disjuncture between state policies and
practitioners’ ideals. This may be cast as a conflict between social and cultural development priorities as envisaged by the practi-
tioners as opposed to economic development priorities as embodied in the stateÕs cultural economic policies. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science
Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
At the opening of a local conference titled ‘‘Art ver-
sus Art: Conflict and Convergence’’ in 1993, Ho Kwon
Ping, Chairman of the Practice Performing Arts Centre,
a private arts school, made the following observation
about the increased attention paid to the arts in Singa-
pore in the late 1980s and 1990s:
We are moving so very rapidly in a national eort
to change this underdeveloped state in the arts. It
was only in 1988 when the Ong Teng Cheong Advi-
sory Council on Art and Culture completed its ex-
tended study. The change that has taken place in
the last five years has been phenomenal: we now
have a Cabinet Minister for the Arts, a National
Arts Council, half a dozen professional performing
companies, a National Gallery under renovation,
arts major degree programmes in both universities
and as much as US $500 million set aside to build
a world class arts centre scheduled to open before
the year 20001 (Art vs Art, 1995, p. 7).
Indeed, the Singapore government aims to make the
city–state a ‘‘global city of the arts’’ by the year 2000
and has spared little eort to achieve this. What has
brought on this vigour in cultural policy and action
which was lacking before? As Liu Kang, one of Singa-
poreÕs pioneer artists noted, the lack of support for the
arts in the post-World War II and early post-indepen-
dence years was stark: the government spent tens of
millions on secondary and primary schools, but nothing
on an arts academy (the Nanyang Academy of Fine
Arts, then the only arts academy in Singapore). It spent
huge sums building structures like the National Stadium
but did little to channel the funds to developing the arts.
Even in the mid-1980s, as Koh (1989, p. 736) pointed
out, the government still held the view that
Material and social welfare, earning a living, and
economic survival have always been SingaporeÕs
mostly immigrant communityÕs primary concerns,
and the arts have never been seen as a ‘‘basic need’’.
As Liu articulated, it was because the government
was very good ‘‘when it came to things related to busi-
ness (the airport, the harbour), but negligent when it
comes to the arts’’ (Art vs Art, 1995, p. 13). Yet, he, like
the state, accepted without question a dichotomy
between ‘‘business’’ and ‘‘the arts’’.
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In this paper, my first intention is to examine the role
of cultural policy2 in a newly industrialised economy
which is at the same time a state with a short history3,
and only nascent beginnings in nation-building and ef-
forts to construct a distinctive cultural identity. As
Dunn (1997, p. 7) advocates in the context of Australia,
I take ‘‘cultural policy’’ beyond the narrow conception
of ‘‘policy development, government process and con-
sultancies’’ to include a ‘‘focus upon power, upon the
forces of oppression and strategies of resistance’’,
‘‘stressing the role of everyday places, of landscapes, in
the formation of culture and identity’’. In examining the
case of Singapore, I hope to develop an understanding
of the intersection between the economic and socio-
cultural agendas behind cultural development policies. I
will illustrate how the hegemony of economic develop-
ment strategies is supported by the ideology and lan-
guage of pragmatism and globalisation and argue that,
as a newly industrialised country which places highest
premium on economic development, the stateÕs eco-
nomic agenda in developing cultural activities is pre-
eminent. Further, I will suggest that, despite the rhetoric
about the importance of the arts in developing a ‘‘gra-
cious society’’, the major motivation behind cultural
policy is economic; indeed, often, the economic works
through the socio-cultural. Certainly, despite fears
about the potential threat to the development of ‘‘Sin-
gaporean’’ artistic and cultural forms posed by cultural
development policies which appear to privilege foreign
talents over local ones, such presumed challenges to the
construction of a ‘‘Singaporean idiom’’ are dismissed by
the state whereas in other arenas, it has been vigorous in
eorts to construct a ‘‘nation’’ and build national
identity.
My second aim in this paper is to examine the re-
ception of and attempts to negotiate (and at times,
contest) these policies by ‘‘cultural practitioners’’4
themselves. In doing so, I will illustrate how there is a
disjuncture between the stateÕs policies and the intents of
practitioners, which may be appropriately cast as a
conflict between social and cultural development prior-
ities as envisaged by the practitioners as opposed to
economic development priorities as embodied in the
stateÕs cultural economic policies.
My analyses in this paper are motivated as much by a
perceived lacuna in the academic literature as a com-
mitment to policy analysis. Much of the literature on
cultural policies, particularly cultural economic policies
and the regeneration of cities, has focused on Western
countries, mainly in the US and Europe, and more re-
cently, the UK and Australia (Frith, 1991; Watson,
1991; Bassett, 1993; Bianchini, 1993a; Scott, 1997; Wil-
liams, 1997). Most of the work examines the historical
development of cultural policy, often highlighting early
tendencies to neglect the economic potential of the arts
and subsequent discovery and appropriation as a re-
sponse to global capital restructuring. Some recent
works have begun to explore the interconnections be-
tween capitalist production processes and the cultural
content of outputs, and how this is reflected in the
growth and development of particular places (Scott,
1997; Waterman, 1998). At a more micro-level of anal-
ysis, others have examined specific aspects of cultural
industries, such as the contribution of the cultural in-
dustries sector to employment and trade (Pratt,
1997a,b), and economic organisation of particular cul-
tural industries (for example, Sadler, 1997, on the music
industry). Such analyses have been kept distinct from
examinations of cultural policies from the perspective of
socio-cultural and political agendas. Where such re-
search has been done, particularly in non-Western, de-
veloping country contexts, the tendency has been to
focus on questions of cultural imperialism: addressing
questions about whether there is in fact cultural impe-
rialism at work, and attempts by states through policy
and various actions to halt or at least ameliorate such
impacts (see, for example, Wallis and Malm, 1984; and
Shuker, 1994). Little work has been done which focuses
on the intersection between cultural economic policies
and those cultural policies which bear socio-cultural and
political agendas. In the context of Singapore, no sys-
tematic attention has been given to analysis of cultural
policies (see, however, Koh, 1989). Particularly given
SingaporeÕs penchant towards developmentalism (see
below) and its relatively nascent stage in the construc-
tion of nationhood, this issue bears scrutiny.
In what follows, I will first devote a section to
painting a broad background of Singapore as a devel-
opmental city–state, one steeped in the ideology of
pragmatism, which has led to the development of a re-
markably strong economy in a few short decades. This
will be followed by a brief historical account of the
cultural policies of the 1960s and 1970s to provide the
context for the later discussion. The rest of the paper
will then focus specifically on cultural policy in the 1980s
and 1990s, beginning with the stateÕs rationale for its
policies, the conditions which prompted the develop-
ment of an explicit cultural economic policy and
the specific strategies it adopted to implement its poli-
cies. This will be followed by a discussion of how
practitioners view these policies and their attempts to
negotiate and manoeuvre for space for cultural devel-
opment in their own terms, in order to serve their own
2 I adopt an expansive notion of culture to include both what is
traditionally considered ‘‘high culture’’ and ‘‘popular culture’’.
3 Singapore gained independence from Britain in 1963 as part of
Malaya but left the Federation in 1965 to become an independent
republic.
4 By this, I refer to those engaging in the arts, such as dancers,
playwrights, actors and directors. I do not include those who are
essentially business people engaged in culture industries but do not
participate in the creative process as such.
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socio-cultural agendas rather than the stateÕs economic-
driven ones. I will conclude by evaluating the hegemony
of the economic and arguing for the need for policies
which develop local cultural resources such that the arts
is part and parcel of peopleÕs everyday lives in as much
as the everyday and ordinary contribute to cultural de-
velopment. In other words, I argue for a cultural policy,
which pulls together economic as well as socio-cultural
agendas such that the latter do not simply serve the
former.
2. Singapore: a developmental city–state
In this section, I will lay out the context within which
SingaporeÕs cultural economic policy of the 1980s and
1990s must be understood. Specifically, I will focus on,
first, its ideological position: as a developmental city–
state and one that subscribes to the tenets of pragma-
tism, and second, a brief description of its economic
development since independence.
According to Castells (1992, p. 56), a state is devel-
opmental when:
...it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its abil-
ity to promote and sustain development, under-
standing by development the combination of
steady high rates of economic growth and structur-
al change in the productive system, both domesti-
cally and in its relationship to the international
economy.
While economic development is a priority in all types
of countries, a developmental state is distinguished
through the absolute prioritising of economic growth
and its use as a prime indicator of government perfor-
mance. In the case of Singapore, evidence that economic
development is given the highest priority takes various
forms, for example, the privileging of land for economic
use; the status of state economic agencies and adminis-
trators and the coordination of planning at the highest
levels of government; and the continuous fine tuning
and multiplication of incentives and economic pro-
grammes, based partly on the detailed monitoring of
industry needs and development intentions.
This prioritising of economic development above
other concerns is rooted in the pragmatism of the state,
which in turn stems from the ‘‘politics of survival’’ in the
1960s when the urgency of raising the social conditions
of the masses was seen to justify a shift away from the
socialist strategies earlier advocated (Chua, 1985). The
crux of the pragmatic ideology is that policy can be
justified where there exists, from the stateÕs perspective,
an acceptable rational response (Hill and Lian, 1995,
p. 190). For a developmental city–state, an acceptable
rational response is an action which contributes to
economic development.
The combined eect of the developmentalist and
pragmatic ideologies is that SingaporeÕs economic de-
velopment has been quite phenomenal in its post-inde-
pendence years. Singapore has moved from developing
country to newly industrialising economy to its present
status of ‘‘advanced industrialising nation’’ in 30 short
years. This economic development can be summarised in
four main phases according to dierences in perfor-
mance and management (see Perry et al., 1997). In brief,
the immediate post-independence years forming the first
phase saw the most rapid growth and were characterised
by the primacy of textiles and garments and the pro-
duction of electronics and electrical goods which gen-
erated about half the manufacturing employment
growth, and entrepot trade.
While economic growth continued in the second
phase of development (1974–1984), overall growth slo-
wed down, reflecting the less favourable circumstances
in the world economy partly associated with the two
international oil shocks. Domestic-market and low val-
ue, labour intensive industries such as food and bever-
ages, textiles and wood products declined in relative
importance while industries which expanded rapidly
included petroleum refining, chemical products, fabri-
cated metal products, electrical and electronic products
and components as well as machinery and precision
equipment (Tan, 1995, p. 57). Singapore also consoli-
dated its role as an international financial centre in the
1970s. In the late 1970s, sustained economic expansion,
which by now was resulting in an increasing dependence
on foreign workers led the government to embark on a
‘‘second industrial revolution’’ to force the pace of
technological upgrading. R&D capacity and technical
skills were given special attention, evident for example,
in expanded government R&D funding, including sup-
port to a new Software Technology Centre and the
opening of a Science Park.
However, the desired economic transformation did
not take place. In the third phase of development (1985–
1986), real GDP declined as international economic
conditions contributed to the only recession so far en-
countered by independent Singapore. The government
appointed a ministerial committee to identify the causes
of the downturn and to identify ‘‘new directions’’ for
growth. The Committee proposed various diversification
strategies, with recommendations for a number of sub-
stantive economic areas, such as manufacturing, tour-
ism, construction, commerce, trade and services. One of
the important orientations of pertinence to the discus-
sion in this paper is the recommendation to encourage
overseas headquarters to relocate to Singapore and to
build a ‘‘total business centre’’ in which Singapore would
become an important strategic node of global companies
for the Asia–Pacific region (EDB, 1988, p. 12).
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The most recent phase of economic development, led
by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong who replaced Lee
Kuan Yew in 1990, is shaped by a central document, the
Strategic Economic Plan (MTI, 1991), which is partly a
restatement of established goals. It speaks of positioning
Singapore as a global city, by making it a ‘‘total business
hub’’ for the Asia–Pacific and oering a business loca-
tion on par with other leading global cities. The at-
traction of high tech, knowledge-intensive industries is
to be intensified, along with investment to enhance la-
bour skills and innovation capacity. Another important
dimension of 1990s strategy is a regionalisation drive,
which has involved Singapore-based companies moving
their operations to regional locations, a strategy aimed
at enhancing their competitiveness and expanding Sin-
gapore’s economic space beyond its limited geographical
boundaries.
3. Cultural policy in Singapore: the view from ‘‘above’’
3.1. The primacy of socio-political agendas: 1960s and
1970s
In this sub-section, my intention is to illustrate the
substance of cultural policy in the 1960s and 1970s as a
backdrop to the main discussion focusing on the rise
of cultural economic policy in the 1980s and 1990s.
SingaporeÕs cultural policy in the 1960s and 1970s was
focused primarily on how artistic and cultural activities
could be used for nation-building purposes and how the
negative influences associated with ‘‘yellow culture’’ of
the ‘‘decadent West’’ were to be avoided. A statement by
the Minister for Culture, Mr Jek Yuen Thong, in 1974
made this point distinctly:
Literature, music and the fine arts have a significant
role to play from within the framework of nation
building. A truly Singaporean art must reflect val-
ues that will serve Singapore in the long run. Faced
with threats from the aggressive culture of the
West, our own arts must reflect countervailing val-
ues that will be helpful to Singapore (Press release,
28 June 1974).
This view was variously repeated by other members
of government, for example, when government MP Tay
Boon Too argued that ‘‘the various orchestras, dance
troupes and choirs in the National Theatre should be
regarded as a cultural army representative of Singapore’’
(Parliamentary Debates, 22 March 1971, col. 998) and
when the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for
Culture, Inche ShaÕari Tadin, asserted that ‘‘the arts can
play a vital role in nation-building through the incul-
cation of correct values’’, especially since, ‘‘more than
ever’’, Singapore was faced with ‘‘the threats from the
aggressive culture of the West’’ (Press release, 30
November 1974). By the mid to late 1970s, this took
active form with the government encouraging the com-
position of songs by Singaporeans to help ‘‘develop a
sense of national identity and instill a sense of patriotism
in our young people’’ (Parliamentary Debates, 16 March
1977, col. 1078). Engagement in the arts, it was hoped,
would also ‘‘redeem us from the ill-eects of a materi-
alistic, money-oriented existence’’ (Inche ShaÕari Tadin,
Press release, 30 November 1974), especially important
given the emphasis on economic development in the
newly independent state. Artistic pursuits, defined by the
state, were to be purveyed to the person-in-the-street,
with the introduction of, for example, a series of monthly
‘‘Art for everyone’’ exhibitions that toured the commu-
nity centres, organised by the Ministry of Culture.
At the same time that ‘‘healthy’’ artistic and cultural
pursuits were deemed to have a role in nation-building,
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the government also
held the view that cultural products, particularly popu-
lar cultural products from the West constituted ‘‘un-
healthy’’ ‘‘yellow’’ culture which ‘‘destroy[ed] [young
peopleÕs] sense of value, and corrode[d] their willingness
to pay attention to serious thought’’ (Lee, 1967). As
Inche ShaÕari Tadin argued,
It is important to have a rich, established cultural
tradition particularly at this time of SingaporeÕs de-
velopment. This is because there is the danger of
our Republic being inundated by undesirable influ-
ences from the outside world. Already many young
people are mindlessly aping foreign mannerism.
They think that the process of modernisation sim-
ply means drug-taking, a-go-go dancing and por-
nography. Once our youths have adequate
cultural anchorage, they will be less prone to these
modern excesses (Press release, 26 April 1973).
The values and lifestyles that were associated with the
‘‘decadent West’’ included the keeping of long hair,
hippism and drugs, and it was believed that these were
purveyed through cultural products such as rock music,
foreign films and television programmes. Nightspots
such as nightclubs with live bands and discos were
closed down and bans and censorship were introduced
and tightened in a bid to control the insidious dangers.
In short, the socio-political agendas of cultural poli-
cies were pre-eminent in the 1960s and 1970s. Con-
versely, the conception of a cultural economy was
somewhat circumscribed. The only significant cultural
economic policy was a tourism strategy which sought to
promote Singapore as a destination where tourists could
enjoy, inter alia, the arts and cultures of Asia in one
destination, using the banner of ‘‘Instant Asia’’ as a
promotional tool. This was the tack that the then
Singapore Tourism Promotion Board took from about
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1969 to the late 1970s. However, apart from the active
pursuit of a tourist cultural policy, recognition of and
eorts to tap the economic potential of the arts and
culture in other ways were, at best, feeble, including, for
example, turning arts and crafts products into souvenirs
for the tourist industry (Press release, 19 July 1973).
3.2. The rise of cultural economic policy: 1980s and 1990s
At the start of the 1980s, the ocial view of the re-
lationship between culture and economy was still one in
which culture was thought of as the superstructural icing
on the Marxist cake. The state was clear that the econ-
omy had to be taken care of first, while artistic pursuits
could follow later. Dhanabalan (1983, p. 16), then
Minister for Culture, expressed this unequivocally when
he said,
We often talk of improving the quality of life in
Singapore as distinct from improving the standard
of living. We have concentrated, and rightly so,
on improving the standard of living of Singapore-
ans. . . . Without better standards of living – more
jobs, more housing, more education, better health
– one cannot hope to improve the quality of life.
The quality of life, in his estimation, referred to more
‘‘peripheral’’ issues such as artistic and cultural pursuits.
The view was taken further with the position that eco-
nomic prosperity was a necessary pre-condition for ar-
tistic creativity (Sabapathy, 1995, p. 16), a view that was
not borne out in reality.5
By 1985, however, when Singapore was in the midst
of an economic recession, the Economic Committee
tasked to chart future directions for growth proposed
diversification strategies, and some attention began to be
paid to the arts as a potential growth area. It was
deemed part of the ‘‘service sector’’, albeit a relatively
minor part. Specifically, ‘‘cultural and entertainment
services’’ were given brief attention as one of 17 service
categories that could be further developed.6 Several
recommendations were made as to the role of the cul-
tural and entertainment services, defined to include the
performing arts (popular music, symphony, drama), film
production (for theatres and television), museums and
art galleries, and entertainment centres and theme parks.
These recommendations were made in recognition of the
fact that such services were economic activities in their
own right; that they enhanced Singapore as a tourism
destination; improved the quality of life and helped
people to be more productive; and contributed to a
vibrant cultural and entertainment scene which would
make Singapore more interesting for foreign profes-
sionals and skilled workers, and could help attract them
to work and develop their careers here (Report of the
Sub-Committee on the Service Sector, 1985, p. 211).
The specific recommendations made by the sub-
committee on the service sector were to develop arts
festivals along the lines of the successful Hong Kong
Arts Festival and the Festival of Asian Arts; to harness
the potential of television in promoting variety shows,
music and singing competitions, and popular drama; to
develop a more extensive range of museum and art
galleries with richer and more interesting selections
which would be more attractive to foreigners; and to
develop high quality theme parks with local historical
and cultural flavour. The report also recognised the
problems involved. First, SingaporeÕs educational sys-
tem did not emphasise the development of artistic and
creative talent, focused as it was on technical and pro-
fessional skills. For that, it was recommended that some
tertiary institutions should develop departments of fine
arts and performing arts, and that more financial sup-
port be given to private institutions such as the Nanyang
Academy of Fine Arts. Second, the Inland Revenue
Department did not permit non-residential entertainers,
artistes and musicians to enjoy any exemption for in-
come earned in Singapore. The report recommended
that the withholding of such exemption should be re-
considered. Third, land for entertainment purposes in
Singapore is expensive. In Hong Kong, for example,
land for cultural centres is usually provided free by the
government with value unassessed. In 1984, the Hong
Kong government also spent over HK $90 million to
maintain arts events and performing companies. It was
recommended that some of the more successful cultural
and entertainment programmes in Hong Kong could be
considered for Singapore. Fourth, television was then
owned by the government in Singapore and therefore
not suciently competitive in the market place. The
report recommended that some privatisation should be
introduced. Finally, film production had been dicult to
develop in Singapore because of the scarcity of scenic or
interesting places, the high cost of labour and a small
domestic market although no specific recommendations
were made to rectify this.
These recommendations represented the first explicit,
albeit somewhat ad hoc, acknowledgement of the
economic potential of artistic and cultural activities,
and although there were few clear signs that the
recommendations were systematically taken up in the
5 In the 1950s and 1960s when Singapore was economically not very
well developed, some exciting work was produced in the visual arts by
artists such as Cheong Soo Pieng, Liu Kang, Chen Chong Swee, Chen
Wen Hsi and Georgette Chen. They ‘‘examined conventions in the
light of the realities in this part of the world, consolidated fresh
imagery and subject, created distinct visual languages and produced
innovative work that crystallised formative, historical phases of art in
Singapore’’ (Sabapathy, 1995, pp. 16–17).
6 The others were classified under six divisions: transport and
communications, business services, financial services, commerce,
personal and social services, and others.
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three to five years following the report, many have since
then been given serious attention and carefully devel-
oped. In the meantime, however, other recommenda-
tions and reports emerged at the same time as new
discourses which overtook in the public arena, and
which drew away attention that might have been pub-
licly, explicitly and exclusively given to the development
of a cultural economic policy. The Report of the Advi-
sory Council on Culture and the Arts (popularly labeled
the Ong Teng Cheong Report because the then 2nd
Deputy Prime Minister chaired the Council) was a key
document, produced in 1989, which was to form the
blueprint for cultural policy in Singapore. It gave due
acknowledgement to the importance of the arts for
‘‘personal enrichment’’, that is, ‘‘broaden[ing] our minds
and deepen[ing] our sensitivities’’; to ‘‘improve the
general quality of life’’, ‘‘strengthen our social bond’’
and ‘‘contribute to our tourist and entertainment sec-
tors’’ (Report of the Advisory Council, 1989, p. 3). It
outlined as key strategies the need to ‘‘encourage more
people to develop an interest in culture and the arts, to
take part in art activities as amateurs or as professionals,
to build up a pool of good artistes, arts administrators,
arts entrepreneurs and other related professionals, to
develop more modern purpose-built performing, work-
ing and exhibition facilities for the arts, libraries and
specialized museums/galleries, to step up the level and
tempo of cultural activities and have more works of art
in public places, and to encourage and promote more
original Singapore works’’ (Report of the Advisory
Council, 1989, p. 3). The substantive outcome of the
report was that the National Arts Council (NAC) and
the National Heritage Board (NHB) were established to
spearhead the development of dierent aspects of the
arts in Singapore. According to its mission statement,
the NACÕs function is to ‘‘support and promote the
practice of the arts by nurturing local artistic and cre-
ative talent; to actively promote Singaporean arts and
artists both here and abroad . . . to provide and manage
a number of dierent performance and exhibition-re-
lated facilities for the arts, and constantly strive to at-
tract to Singapore a wide range of international artistic
talent and events (http://www.nac.gov.sg). In turn, the
NHB seeks to ‘‘explore and present the culture and
heritage of Singapore through the collection, preserva-
tion, interpretation and display of objects and records so
as to promote a better understanding of our roots and
instill a sense of national identity in Singaporeans’’
(http://www.nhb.gov.sg). The decision to establish the
Esplanade was also the direct outcome of the CouncilÕs
recommendation.
In sum, the Ong Teng Cheong report was an im-
portant watershed in the development of the arts and
culture in Singapore. However, in its focus on specific
strategies and recommendations, the Report did not
champion either an economic or socio-political agenda,
acknowledging both roundly in the vision statement. To
that extent, the Report did the work of focusing atten-
tion on the development of culture and the arts in
Singapore but, as a document, did not appear to privi-
lege such development for either economic or socio-
political ends.
By the 1990s, two other discourses and related poli-
cies had also emerged: that of globalisation and re-
gionalisation in the area of economic development, and
that of developing a world class city and a ‘‘gracious
society’’ in the area of socio-cultural and urban
development.
In an earlier section, I have already discussed the
strategy of globalisation and regionalisation as a means
of maintaining and extending SingaporeÕs economy. In
the 1990s, there was an explosion of attention to this
strategy, as reflected in government-led eorts to es-
tablish businesses in China and India, for example, and
further exhortations for Singaporeans to venture over-
seas. Public discourse was acutely focused on this phe-
nomenon, if evident in nothing else, then in the 461
pages of text generated from a search of newspaper ar-
ticles from one local daily between 1992 and mid 1996
with the keyword ‘‘globalisation’’.
In terms of developing the city and society, the state
engaged in a high-profile public discourse about devel-
oping a ‘‘world class city’’. In 1991, the government
launched Living The Next Lap, a document to guide the
city’s development, covering all the key areas of life,
from housing and education to defence. In 1992, the
ruling PeopleÕs Action Party used it as its election
manifesto. A key component of this vision is the Revised
Concept Plan, a planning blueprint put together mainly
by the Urban Redevelopment Authority, intended to
help Singapore ‘‘make a quantum leap’’ in the quality of
its environment (Living the Next Lap, 1991, p. 3) so that
there would be a developed city for (a) business, (b)
living and (c) leisure, and (d) one with world class
transportation, and (e) endowed with nature. While
planning for Singaporeans, the blueprint also took
cognisance of the need to retain a quality foreign
workforce, and the need to give increasing consideration
to the preferences of professional and skilled workers, be
it in housing, leisure or other facilities.
Particularly from the mid-1990s, the state has also
developed a public rhetoric that emphasises the devel-
opment of a ‘‘gracious society’’, an apparent shift from
the earlier emphasis on economic development per se.
For example, in a speech addressing youth leaders in
1996, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong outlined his vi-
sion for Singapore’s socio-cultural development where-
by the country is characterised by a civic-conscious and
gracious people, and an intellectual, cultivated, com-
passionate and caring society. It is one in which uni-
versities will be throbbing with ideas, and where there is
a thriving arts scene. While there is no serious suggestion
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that economic growth should be halted, the idea that the
‘‘non-tangible aspects of life’’ need greater priority
gained wider currency, as expressed in the Prime Min-
ister’s view that there is more to being a successful
country than having lots of money. Rather, a successful
country is one in which its people are able to appreciate
the finer things in life and are concerned for one another
and public property (The Straits Times, 22 April 1996).
One measure of a more gracious and cultivated people
while keeping up with the pressures that he suggested
was the ability to enjoy good music. He used that as a
metaphor for the finer things in life, which reflected his
larger statement that the arts were important to Singa-
pore because they made for a more thinking, gracious
and sophisticated society.
Given the lack of public attention paid to the 1985
recommendations for the development of a cultural
economy, the paucity of concrete developments in the
years immediately following, the even acknowledgement
of the socio-cultural, political and economic role of the
arts in the Ong Teng Cheong report, and the emergence
of other discourses in the public arena, particularly
those which emphasise the importance of developing a
‘‘gracious, cultivated’’ society, it is tempting to conclude
that the state is now focusing on developing the arts in
Singapore for its own sake. Despite the rhetoric, I will
argue, based on my analysis of other state pronounce-
ments as well as concrete actions, that some extremely
hard-headed economics underlies the recent promotion
of artistic and cultural activities. Indeed, the economic
works through the socio-cultural, illustrating its
hegemony.
Evidence that the state became cognisant of the eco-
nomic potential of culture and the arts at the highest
level may be found in the pronouncements that were
emanating from no less than the then Minister for In-
formation and the Arts, George Yeo,7 as well as from
other government Members of Parliament (MPs) and
leaders of government bodies. Yeo was most active
among Ministers in publicly suggesting that ‘‘to be
competitive in the next phase of our national develop-
ment, we need to promote the arts’’ (Yeo, 1991, p. 56)
and that while Singapore had been ‘‘an international
market for rubber, for spices, for oil, for Asian Currency
Units, for gold futures, and for many other things’’, it
also hoped to be ‘‘an international market for the arts’’
(Yeo, 1993, p. 66). This was because
We should see the arts not as luxury or mere con-
sumption but as investment in people and the envi-
ronment. We need a strong development of the arts
to help make Singapore one of the major hub cities
of the world. . . . We also need the arts to help us
produce goods and services which are competitive
in the world market. We need an artistic culture
. . . we also need taste. With taste, we will be able
to produce goods and services of far greater value
(Yeo, 1991, p. 54).
Some of these views were echoed by government MP
Heng Chiang Meng, who used economic arguments to
ask for better financial support of cultural activities. He
suggested that
. . . such funding can be viewed as supporting an in-
fant industry. Looking at the arts industry in Lon-
don and New York, I see no reason why Singapore
cannot be a major arts centre if we put our minds to
it . . . all the necessary ingredients for the promotion
of arts as an exportable industry are here . . . (Par-
liamentary Debates, 21/3/91, col. 944–46).
He cited for support the view that a wide range of
industrial products needed not only to be functional and
durable, but that increasingly, there was demand that
they were also well-designed and aesthetically pleasing.
Hence, an artistic base was crucial to industrial progress.
Then Executive Director of the NAC, Foo Meng
Liang, also expressed the view that there are economic
reasons for arts promotion, citing figures to show how
the arts in UK provided half-a-million jobs and ac-
counted for 27% of the earnings from tourism in 1987
and how the arts created about 110,000 jobs in the New
York–New Jersey area, and generated an annual turn-
over of US $9.8 billion (Art vs Art, 1995, p. 29). The
Chairman of the NAC, Liu Thai Ker, also articulated
the view that there was nothing wrong in the arts being
‘‘aligned with economic impetuses’’. He argued that
while the arts was traditionally associated with the need
to be subsidised, the government now recognised that
the economic gains were potentially far greater than the
expenditure, which made government spending on the
arts justifiable. His view was that investment in the arts
was the act of a ‘‘responsible government’’ (Personal
interview, 12 May 1997).
Given this recognition, the government began to
pursue more rigorously policies and strategies to harness
the economic potential of the arts particularly in the
1990s. All three types of cultural economic policies that
Frith (1991) identified are evident. First, the state
through its agencies such as the Economic Development
Board (EDB) and Trade Development Board (TDB),
has been aggressive in promoting an industrial cultural
policy, defined as the local production of cultural goods
to be consumed nationally or exported. Examples of
cultural goods are electronic goods (the radio, discman
etc.), the mass media (film, television programmes etc.),
artistic productions (theatre, dance etc.) and fashion. As
7 George Yeo was Minister for Information and the Arts until mid-
1999.
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part of the promotional strategy, in 1990, the EDB set
up a Creative Services Strategic Business Unit, later
renamed the Creative Business Programme, to ‘‘develop
Singapore into a centre of excellence for the various
creative industries’’ (EDB, 1992, p. 2). In 1991, it de-
veloped a Creative Services Development Plan as the
blueprint for the development of the four major sectors,
defined as film and music, media, design, and arts and
entertainment (EDB Press Release, 10 December 1991).
The development plan was translated into specific
goals and actions. In terms of the filmmaking industry,
the EDBÕs aim was to develop Singapore into a movie
production centre and a film hub for international film-
makers. This economic investment was envisaged to
involve transfer of technology, job and training oppor-
tunities, and potential business for the hotel and tourist
industries. The EDB therefore sought to bring compa-
nies from Europe, the US, Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Australia to establish world-class facilities such as film
laboratories, movie studios, production and post-pro-
duction services (EDB, 1992, p. 3). A whole range of
other incentives were introduced, for example: (a) pio-
neer status and a five to ten year tax holiday to com-
panies which produce movies in Singapore on a long-
term basis; (b) waiver of withholding tax on income for
foreign stars and creative talents such as producers, di-
rectors, costume and set designers, lighting and sound
engineers in the movie industry; (c) investment allow-
ance incentive for pioneer status companies, in which a
write-o against taxable income of up to 50% of costs
incurred in purchasing new equipment is granted, in
order to encourage investments in high-tech equipment
(d) sponsorship grants to training consultants who train
develop and transfer expertise and knowledge to Sin-
gaporeans; and (e) waiver of script censorship for pro-
ducers who want to make movies in Singapore develop
and transfer expertise and knowledge to Singaporeans
(EDB, 1992, pp. 4–5). In April 1998, the Ministry of
Information and the Arts (MITA) gave a further boost
to the industry by setting up a Singapore Film Com-
mission, with S $2.5 million worth of grants from the
EDB, the Singapore Tourism Board (STB) and MITA
to disburse as scholarships and seed money for film
projects so as to encourage Singaporeans to produce
good Singapore-made films (Tong, 28 April 1998, p. 3).
Similar attention was paid to other industries such as
the video and music industries. The governmentÕs two-
pronged approach to enhance the capabilities of the
video industry with state-of-the-art equipment and tal-
ents involved (a) enhancing capabilities to ensure a
growing pool of trained personnel by introducing
training grants; and (b) promoting niche players who are
capable of penetrating the world market with their
special programmes and services such as telemovies and
documentaries, for example, Asian Business Report, a
locally-produced TV programme which is shown inter-
nationally (EDB, 1992, p. 7). Within the music industry,
tax incentives have also attracted companies such as
East Gate Technology and P + O Compact Disc to es-
tablish themselves in Singapore and bring with them
their high precision CD Mastering and Replication
equipment and highly-trained engineers and technicians
to produce CDs in Singapore. These state-of-the-art
facilities have provided ‘‘synergies’’ (Thrift and Olds,
1996), such that Singapore has become able to ‘‘provide
value-added creative services for recording companies
and artistes to produce their work even more economi-
cally and within the shortest time possible’’ (EDB, 1992,
p. 9).
In the area of art, the TDB and EDB have also helped
to promote a major international art and antiques fair in
Singapore, Tresors dÕArts. Since 1993, Tresors has be-
come a major annual event. The fair brings major art
galleries and antique dealers from Asia and Europe to
Singapore and attracts collectors, buyers, sellers, dealers
and art professionals from all over the world. To facil-
itate this, the government has decreed that profits of
dealers derived from transactions on behalf of non-res-
ident clients with approved auction houses qualify for a
special concessionary tax rate of 10% instead of the
normal corporate tax rate of 27%. The Goods and
Services Tax is also lifted from non-resident buyers,
which is encouraging for those who come to auction
houses and art galleries here, for example. To attract
foreign arts-related personnel so that they may con-
tribute to the knowledge transfer and the production of
arts products, the state has also introduced more liberal
rules for granting permanent residence to artists, art
authenticators, valuers, restorers, collectors, reviewers,
art historians and other personnel required to support
the art and antique industries (Yeo, 1993, p. 66).
The production of cultural goods to be exported is
also encouraged. Under the National Arts CouncilÕs new
International Relations Unit (established in 1998), cul-
tural acts by groups/individuals are selected to perform
elsewhere so as to enhance their reputation, to sell the
image that Singapore is not only a city of business but a
city of arts as well, and to earn revenue. Thus, an early
eort in this direction involved NACÕs selection of 17 art
groups/individuals as its pioneer group, which was
marketed at the Australian Arts Market in Adelaide in
early 1998. The eort was repeated in December 1998 in
Montreal.
While aggressively pursuing an industrial cultural
policy, the state has also adopted a tourist cultural
policy and an urban cosmetics policy which reinforce
each other. This is reflected most unequivocally in a
statement by government MP Yu-Foo Yee Shoon
(Parliamentary Debates, 23 March 1990, col. 764) that
Singapore was well-placed to ‘‘absorb the best of
Eastern and Western arts and culture for the smooth
development of tourism and economic development’’ so
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that both tourists and international investors could en-
joy ‘‘a certain degree of cultural life’’. The value of
culture and the arts to tourism is acknowledged by Tong
Min Way, Director of Corporate Aairs at MITA, who
announced in 1995 that the state intended to develop
‘‘cultural tourism’’ as a ‘‘distinct industry’’ (Brady,
1995). At the same time, Minister George Yeo (1993,
p. 65) has made explicit the fact that the multitudinous
actions to generate artistic activity in Singapore also
belie an urban cosmetic policy:
We want to make Singapore a centre for the arts
partly for its own sake and partly because we need
the arts to help make us a centre for brain services.
We want talent from all over the world to meet
here, to work here and to live here. They must enjoy
being here – the people, the food, the music, the
cosmopolitan air. We cannot work the magic with-
out the arts. This is why we will be spending quite a
lot of money – about a billion dollars – over the
next five to ten years building new cultural facilities
and expanding existing ones.
Tamney (1996, p. 154) has expressed this pointedly as
the governmentÕs belief that ‘‘educated, auent people
will be more content if there are various artistic and
literary works for their amusement and enlightenment’’.
In specific terms, a clear tourism strategy has been
developed, part of which emphasises culture and the
arts. More broad-based attempts to create a city
throbbing with arts and cultural activities so that it may
be attractive to investors and ‘‘foreign talent’’ have
taken the form of developing infrastructure to make
Singapore a ‘‘regional hub’’ or a ‘‘global city for the
arts’’ (The Straits Times, 1 June 1997; 27 August 1997; 1
April 1998).
The STB has aggressively developed a strategy for
tourism development in a blueprint called Tourism 21,
which adopts a cluster development approach in the
development of the industry. It identifies 13 dierent
areas of ‘‘themed attractions’’, including ‘‘culture and
heritage’’, and ‘‘arts and entertainment’’. In terms of
culture and heritage, the STB has sought to revitalise
various ‘‘thematic districts’’, including Chinatown,
Singapore River, Little India and Kampong Glam,
emphasising the culture and history of these areas (see
Yeoh and Kong, 1994; Chang, 1996), developing inter-
pretive centres and walking guides which cover histori-
cal and cultural walking trails through the districts. It
has also organised, co-organised or sponsored a series of
cultural events such as the Singapore River Hong Bao
Õ98 (with fireworks, variety shows and night stalls to
welcome the Chinese New Year), and Chingay Parade
(touted as ‘‘one of the most exciting and grandest cul-
tural events in South-East Asia, featuring the best multi-
cultural performing groups and marching bands
from Singapore and all over the world’’ (http://
www.stb.com.sg)). To attract tourists to Singapore, the
STB has held overseas promotions of these events
through regional tour operators and travel agents (Seah,
1997).
While the STB has worked with the Urban Redevel-
opment Authority (URA), particularly in enhancing the
culture and heritage of thematic districts, in terms of
arts and entertainment, it has worked closely with the
NAC and EDB to bring in popular performances. More
and more major pop and rock acts are bringing their
touring machines, from Michael Jackson, Paul Simon
and Natalie Cole to Jacky Cheung and Anita Mui,
which has brought in their train of regional audiences,
particularly rich Filipino and Indonesian youngsters
(Art vs Art, 1995, p. 147). London West End and
Broadway musicals have also been brought in, such as
Cats and Les Miserables, not only to ‘‘keep Singapore-
ans entertained’’ but to ‘‘draw art lovers from other
parts of the region’’ (Brady, 1995). This is done in full
recognition that ‘‘for every dollar spent on a theater
ticket, six or seven more are spent on related services’’
such as meals, lodging and souvenirs (Brady, 1995). For
this reason, the EDB has ‘‘opened doors’’ for companies
such as Cameron Mackintosh, thus encouraging it to set
up a Southeast Asian base in Singapore, as has Andrew
Lloyd Webber’s Really Useful Group (Brady, 1995,
p. 40). The outcome of the synergies generated is that
big companies have bought blocks of seats for perfor-
mances, catering to touring groups – ‘‘just as they do in
Sydney, New York and London’’ (Brady, 1995, p. 40).
Indeed, George Yeo (1993, p. 65) has used Cats and Les
Miserables as a measure of success, indicating that if
they are able to attract not only Singaporeans but also
bring in audiences from the region, then ‘‘Singapore will
be on its way to being a theatre hub in Southeast Asia’’.
The various attempts to make Singapore a regional
hub for the arts have been further enhanced by a huge
injection of funds by the state to the tune of S $1 billion
to develop new and upgrade old cultural facilities. In
particular, a new Singapore Arts Centre (SAC, named
the Esplanade – Theatres on the Bay) is being con-
structed by 2001, with a complex of four theatres, a
concert hall and studios. Its then Executive Director
(Robert Iau) sees it to comprise sucient facilities to
cater to the needs of the ‘‘240 million people in the re-
gion’’ rather than the 3 million in Singapore (Personal
interview, 20 May 1997). When completed, the Espla-
nade will have a 1600 seat concert hall, three smaller
theatres, and a 2000 seat Lyric Theatre. It will cater to
both classical and popular events. Another major ini-
tiative on which the significant budget has been spent is
the development of three museums, the Singapore His-
tory Museum, the Singapore Art Museum and the Asian
Civilisations Museum, under the aegis of a National
Heritage Board established in 1993. Together, these
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museums will present the trends and developments that
have characterised and shaped life and history in Sin-
gapore (Singapore History Museum), the contemporary
art of Southeast Asia (Singapore Art Museum), and the
ancestral cultures of Singaporeans, namely, through the
Southeast Asian, South Asian, East Asian and West
Asian collections (Asian Civilisations Museum).
3.3. The ‘‘mutedness’’ of social-cultural and political
agendas?
Compared to the aggressiveness with which cultural
economic policies have been pursued, the state has been
relatively muted in pushing socio-political agendas via
cultural policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Public rhetoric by
state leaders continued periodically about the impor-
tance of culture and arts development as part of nation-
building (Ker, 1994, p. 113) and the importance of
artists in helping to record, preserve, and propagate
SingaporeÕs cultural heritage so that ‘‘subsequent gen-
erations of people [may] understand their roots better,
and know what binds them as a people and as a nation’’
(Wong, 1987, pp. 38–39).
Probably the most significant programmes developed
during this period which reflected the stateÕs socio-cul-
tural and political agendas were those aimed at devel-
oping a sense of national identity and those designed to
bring the arts to the community. The former is best
exemplified in the ‘‘Sing Singapore’’ programme intro-
duced in 1988 and held in some form or other every two
years since then.8 This involved the penning and popu-
larisation of songs in a ‘‘Sing Singapore’’ package, in-
tended to achieve an ideologically hegemonic eect.
Through various means of dissemination (including the
constant airing on national television and radio; the
organisation of community singing sessions in commu-
nity centres; and teaching schoolchildren these songs
during school assembly time at the directive of the
Ministry of Education), an attempt was made to per-
suade and reinforce in Singaporeans the idea that
Singapore has come a long way since its founding (in
1819) and independence (in 1965); and that Singapore-
ans must play their part in continuing this dramatic
development (see Kong, 1995). In all of these, the ulti-
mate concern is to develop in Singaporeans a love for
their country, a sense of patriotism, and a willingness to
support the ruling elite who have led the country
through the short years since independence to tremen-
dous development. As Yeo Ning Hong, then Minister
for Communications and Information, wrote in his
message for the ‘‘Sing Singapore’’ songbook,
Singing the songs will bring Singaporeans together,
to share our feelings one with another. It will bring
back shared memories of good times and hard
times, of times which remind us of who we are,
where we came from, what we did, and where we
are going. It will bring together Singaporeans of
dierent races and backgrounds, to share and to ex-
press the spirit of the community, the feeling of to-
getherness, the feeling of oneness. This, in essence,
is what the ‘‘Sing Singapore’’ programme is about
(Sing Singapore, 1988).
The second component of cultural policy and strategy
during this period which underscored socio-cultural
agendas was the concern to infuse in the population at
large an interest in the arts, reflecting the Prime Minis-
terÕs vision of making Singapore a ‘‘gracious society’’.
This has been attempted through three types of pro-
grammes at the NAC: arts exposure, experience and
excursion. Through ‘‘arts exposure’’, the NAC brings
performances to schools in the hope that students will
benefit from the exposure to particular art forms.
Through ‘‘arts experience’’, students are invited to par-
ticipate in activities such as workshops, playwriting and
sculpting. Through ‘‘arts excursions’’, students are
brought to performances in theatre and music, for ex-
ample, and given the opportunity to talk to directors
and performers so that they may have a better appre-
ciation of what engagement in the arts entails. In addi-
tion, the NAC has also sought to bring the arts to the
community through performances in public places such
as public libraries and community centres. It has been
working with the PeopleÕs Association9 in the co-loca-
tion of arts groups in some of the community centres,
and to construct Black Boxes there. It has also held a
successful ‘‘Concert in the Park’’ series, the frequency of
which was recently increased from once to twice a
month (The Straits Times, 10 October 1997). It has
sought to make performances more aordable, includ-
ing fringe programmes in arts festivals to reach out to
the general public (Foo, 1995, p. 30).
While these various eorts clearly have socio-cultural
and/or political agendas, it may also be argued that the
‘‘socio-cultural’’ services the ‘‘economic’’ as well. In this
regard, reference may be made to the state-vaunted view
that SingaporeÕs economic development can be achieved
only if Singaporeans are willing to support their political
leaders and want to play their part in the countryÕs
8 The Sing Singapore Programme, a bi-annual event was started in
1988 by MITA and was subsequently taken over by NAC in 1994,
when it became renamed Sing Singapore: Festival of Songs Õ94. In
1996, it was named Song FestÕ96 and in 1998, it was back to Sing
Singapore: Festival of Songs Õ98.
9 The PeopleÕs Association was formed in 1960 and its mission is to
promote racial harmony and social cohesion through mass participa-
tion in educational, social, cultural, sports and recreational, and other
community activities.
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growth. Therefore, eorts to inculcate such commitment
to their country and leaders, may at least in part, be
aimed at ensuring that conditions for economic devel-
opment are maintained. Cultural policy, as part of the
arsenal to shore up psychological and social defence,10
thus serves indirectly to enhance SingaporeÕs economic
development. Such is the hegemony of a developmen-
talist vision. The logic, however, does not end there, for,
in a circular way, economic development that is main-
tained or enhanced becomes a form of political legiti-
macy for the ruling elites.
4. Cultural policy in Singapore: the view from ‘‘within’’
The primacy of the stateÕs economic agenda is prin-
cipally at odds with the views and intents of arts prac-
titioners.11 In this section, I will focus on one area of
divergence (in relation to the primacy of economic in-
tentions) and one of convergence (in relation to the need
for community involvement) between the state and
practitioners in their view of state cultural policy.
Practitioners are critical of the stateÕs interpretation
of Singapore as a regional centre for the arts. This is
because they read into the stateÕs strategy purely eco-
nomic intents:
I think it’s quite clear that what the government
means by developing the arts is for a very economic
kind of reason. Big touring groups that come in, big
musicals, pop concerts. Michael Jackson is the arts
to them. And that’s the truth, this newfound inter-
est in the arts and the SAC, a lot of it is economic ...
I know a lot of people will be dazzled. You just see
all this analysis of how much money the Michael
Jackson concert alone generated in the economy.
And you get these cash registers ringing in every-
body’s mind (Simon,12 playwright, director and
actor).
However, providing the ‘‘hardware’’ (infrastructure
and facilities) without concomitant attention to the
‘‘software’’ (creative development) (Tim, artistic direc-
tor, arts company) is deemed regressive for the devel-
opment of local/indigenous arts, and Tim argues that
the only outcome will be that
. . . with all the sophisticated and well-developed in-
frastructure, Singapore will be a good magnet for
tourists, travellers, convention goers and other peo-
ple who are involved in international conferences to
stop over and savour international culture in Singa-
pore but there will be little place for local commu-
nities to develop their own art forms. . . .
Exhibitions like the Guggenheim will be quite hap-
py to come to Singapore. Cats and Les Miserables
will be quite happy to show in Singapore, given
all the incentives and help. And I think given the
kind of commercial development we have in film,
we’ll have some of the most up-to-date Hollywood
movies or movies from all over the world being
shown in Singapore. So we will be a kind of place
where top-rate acts from all over the world will be
available at all times. . . . ItÕs also the same for the
visual arts, in terms of art fairs like Tresors and
big auctions like Sotheby’s and Christie’s. There
will be the global flavour that takes place, but there
will not be anything indigenous worth talking
about. This is a serious problem.
He goes on to argue that it will make Singapore ‘‘a
kind of emporium for the arts . . . another retail space in
Singapore’’.
Why do practitioners hold this negative view of
state initiatives which ostensibly will serve the arts
well? As David (playwright) articulates, it is because
with such heavy financial investment in the Esplanade,
there is a need to ‘‘go for surefire successes’’ which
will cover the cost of renting the spaces and eventually
recovering the investment. He and other practitioners
like Simon and Tim, all recognise that few local
groups can aord to use the spaces. Certainly, as
Edwin (playwright) articulates, ‘‘profit-making the-
atre’’ will be favoured above ‘‘exploratory, indigenous
forms’’, with the result that
people who are still exploring new forms feel the
pressure to have to abandon more of those projects
and go for more audience determined plays so that
they can economically justify [their work], so that
they can feel that there is an audience to their
theatre.
Apart from the inability to compete on financial
grounds, artistically, local groups are still experimenting
and finding a distinctively Singapore idiom, and are of
the opinion that they will not yet be able to draw the
crowds in the same way that foreign acts will. As ar-
chitect and critic Tay Kheng Soon put it,
10 Social and psychological defence form part of Singapore’s total
defence strategy. The former refers to the promotion of cohesion
amongst Singapore’s diverse groups so that external subversion
through the exploitation of primordial sentiments would be minimised
while ideals are fully shared by all Singaporeans. Psychological defence
is defined as ’’the means of winning the hearts and minds of the people
and preparing them to confront any national crisis‘‘ (Seah, 1989, p.
956).
11 The discussion in this section is drawn mainly from personal
interviews conducted in May 1997 with a range of ‘‘practitioners’’ such
as playwrights, directors, actors/actresses and dancers.
12 All practitioners have been given pseudonyms unless their views
already appear in published form.
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What is the SAC? It’s primarily a number of big
concert halls to host, under very salubrious condi-
tions, the top performing groups from the devel-
oped world as they cycle through Asia. What
will that do in terms of taste for Singapore exper-
imental art? Zero! Because the Singaporean who
has seen these tremendous shows will look down
upon local productions (Commentary, 1993,
p. 66).
For that reason, Simon is of the opinion that the
Esplanade is ‘‘a huge mistake’’ because it signals the
decision to ‘‘push back the schedule for developing the
small performing spaces in favour of bringing forward
the large facilities’’.
Tim also pursues a similar argument about the de-
velopment of exhibition spaces. He argues that the es-
tablishment of the Singapore Art Museum (SAM) in
1995 has meant that few other venues will be developed
for exhibitions, on the assumption that there was now a
national gallery which promoted and displayed, inter
alia, local art. Yet, he argues, SAM does not rent its
galleries to artists for exhibitions nor can non-SAM sta
seek to curate exhibitions since all exhibitions at SAM
are curated internally. Any exhibition proposal had to
be scrutinised by the curators at a curatorial meeting
with regards to the relevance to the museumÕs mission
and the Singaporean audience before it is recommended
to SAMÕs Art Acquisition and Exhibition Committee
for approval. The protracted and stringent process
leaves little room for local artists to grow through small-
scale exhibitions. As things stand, artists were feeling the
crunch for exhibition space as retail giants such as
Takashimaya closed down/converted their gallery spaces
for other commercial use with the downturn of the
economy in the mid-1990s.
Practitioners also held an unequivocal view about the
need for local artistic development. As Tim highlighted,
no regional or global hub for the arts
whether it was London or Paris in the past, whether
it’s New York today or Tokyo, can ever hope to
achieve that kind of status without having at least
as strong a basis of indigenous works as it does
for international platforms.
Across the dierent art forms, practitioners called for
the opportunity to develop ‘‘something unique to us’’
(Henry, film organiser and music critic), ‘‘real local arts
. . . from the locals and related to local things . . .
something that people are familiar with and can un-
derstand’’ (Irene, dancer). Playwright and director Kuo
Pao Kun asked pointedly:
Can we have a Singapore Arts Centre by just bring-
ing all the arts of the world to Singapore without
our own education, without our own creativity
(Art vs Art, 1995, p. 145)?
In eect, they subscribe to a view of the arts as
‘‘rooted in an understanding of local cultural resources’’
(Bianchini, 1993b, p. 212). As Mahizhnan (Art vs Art,
1995, p. 34) points out, articulating the views of many
practitioners, economic returns should not be the fun-
damental reason for supporting the arts. They should be
the by-products.
Minister George Yeo is, however, unpersuaded by
these arguments, and has spoken unequivocally about
the stateÕs continued intention to provide opportunities
for foreign acts to perform in Singapore and indeed, to
facilitate it:
Nothing is more inimical to the development of the
arts than a false nationalism which tries to protect a
market under the guise of safeguarding some mis-
conceived national essence. We oer Singapore as
a venue and as a stage for artists and those who en-
joy the Arts from all over the world (Yeo, 1992, p.
114).
From this perspective, he is committed to keep the
doors open to ‘‘foreign talent’’, as in ‘‘every other aspect
of our national life’’, for ‘‘[i]f the arts in Singapore are
only by Singaporeans for Singaporeans, we will get
nowhere for we are too small . . . Singapore is Singapore
only because our national spirit is a cosmopolitan one
(Yeo, 1994, p. 36). Furthermore, the state has countered
that it has not neglected the development of local arts,
pointing out that it channels significant funding to local
groups and oers old buildings to house them in the
NACÕs Arts Housing Scheme at subsidised rates13
(Brady, 1995). Yet, scrutiny of the budget makes a
poignant point: while S $1.65 million is channeled (in
1996) to the provision of housing for 41 local arts
groups, two art institutions and 26 individual artists, S
$667 million is expended on the construction of the
Esplanade (National Arts Council Annual Report,
1996).
Given the clear signals from the state, practitioners
and critics have sought to negotiate their preferred so-
cio-cultural agendas within the constraints of the stateÕs
economic agenda in a number of ways. First, and
probably the most eective strategy, is the deliberate but
dicult process of developing ‘‘alternative arts spaces’’
in Singapore. Chief among these is the Substation, an
arts centre established in 1990, which its artistic director,
T. Sasitharan, defines as serving to
13 An arts administrator with a professional drama group, however,
highlights the problems of limited space, yearly leases (and hence
uncertainty), and the need to share facilities with far too many other
groups to be eective (Mary, Personal interview, 8 May 1997).
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· nurture and develop promising, young Singapore ar-
tists;
· encourage Singapore artists to be innovative and bold
in thought and work;
· facilitate arts appreciation among as wide an audi-
ence as possible;
· promote interaction among artists and art lovers of
dierent national, cultural and linguistic back-
grounds;
· raise the level of critical and intellectual discourse on
arts and foster research, study and rigour in artistic
practice; and
· be a centre for an emerging Southeast Asian aesthet-
ic, incorporating the rich visual, musical, perfor-
mance and literary traditions of the region.
The Substation houses a 120-seat theatre, and an art
gallery, a dance studio, two multipurpose rooms, a
garden courtyard for performances and other arts
events, an art shop and a box oce, and has become a
central place to young local artists, providing a space for
rehearsals, installations, workshops and performances,
oering a ‘‘home to cultivate and foster imaginations,
particularly those that find other spaces inhospitable’’
(Artistic statement, T. Sasitharan, http://www.substa-
tion.org.sg; emphasis added). The opportunities it af-
fords new artist(e)s and new styles has rendered it ‘‘an
alternative space for the arts’’ by default, in SasitharanÕs
view:
In Singapore, so much of the established spaces and
companies happen to be working with what is con-
sidered very mainstream or middle-of-the-road
work, so any company which tends to do anything
a little o-centre is considered alternative. And that
is the position of the Substation. . . . When we do an
experimental theatre presentation, or when we do
something about experimental music or contempo-
rary music, contemporary visual arts, which no one
else happens to be doing, that is what we become
identified with.
The Substation provided one of the first Black
Boxes in Singapore in contrast to the prosceniums of
large theatres such as the NAC-run Victoria Theatre.
This ‘‘empowered new actors and new groups and in-
corporated them even though they had no voice
training and no technology’’ and therefore ‘‘allowed
more people access into theatre’’ (Edwin). Simon
articulates the view that the Substation and other al-
ternative spaces have been important for the develop-
ment of Singapore arts because they are ‘‘sanctuaries of
experimentation where one can learn from failure’’
because the pressure to fill audience spaces is not as
great and ‘‘a culture of development’’ is evident. This
is particularly important, in his view, because the
Singaporean
...has this intense fear of failing, of being deemed a
flop. That is sort of very troublesome and counter-
productive when it comes to the arts, in particular,
theatre, when you realise that the moment you dare
not fail, any sort of development is impossible be-
cause you are constantly going in this circumscribed
circle rather than expanding the circle.
Cited alongside the Substation as an ‘‘alternative
space’’ which nurtured local artists is the now defunct
ArtistsÕ Village,14 a spontaneous development that
sprung up around artist Tang Dawu in a village envi-
ronment, ‘‘miles away from proper roads, o a beaten
path, and providing a very nice area for artists to work
in’’ (James, artist). Tim saw it to be an important
milestone in the development of Singapore art, for
‘‘single-handedly, Dawu introduced contemporary vi-
sual arts, and really, most of the significant artists who
are practising to this day in the contemporary field were
in one sense or another associated with Dawu.’’ In
HenryÕs words, the ArtistsÕ Village ‘‘accepted and em-
braced art and gave space for its development’’.
A second strategy of negotiation that practitioners
have adopted is to work within the parameters set up by
the state. This has primarily taken the form of a call for
space within the Esplanade, if not a more open call for
the Esplanade to support local groups. Simon expresses
this most pointedly when he argues that the Esplanade
should be a ‘‘dedicated space for performing arts in
Singapore by Singaporean artistes’’. He nevertheless
acknowledged there was also a need to bring in foreign
performances so that there could be ‘‘synergy, oppor-
tunities for linkages and for learning’’, and so suggested
that, if the Esplanade could not be a space for Singap-
orean artistes alone, it could at least have a resident
local group. Otherwise, he argued, ‘‘it cannot be the
Singapore Arts Centre’’.
Finally, critics and practitioners seek their own
ideological spaces by (re)interpreting the stateÕs cultural
policy, focusing particularly on the Esplanade as the site
of (re)interpretation. The most strident perhaps amongst
those leading the ideological charge is Janadas Devan,
writer and critic, who takes the view that the state is
interested to develop the Esplanade only as a symbol of
its ‘‘power and glory’’. He argues that if the needs of the
practitioners are for small drama centres, small perfor-
mance stages in community centres in various parts of
the island and arts housing facilities, for example, the
fact that the state was spending so much money on the
one location suggests that the Esplanade was really to
serve a purpose other than local cultural development
14 It was closed down because the state took back the rental units for
development purposes.
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(Art vs Art, 1995, p. 63). He interprets it as an attempt
to embody power and glory, citing other examples
around the world – such as the Taj Mahal and Versailles
– of the construction of monuments for the same ends,
be it for king, emperor or state (Art vs Art, 1995, p. 54).
He argues that ‘‘it is precisely because art has always
been about power that we are going to build for our-
selves an Arts Centre. It is not an accident that the
state’s involvement in the arts has taken the form of a
commitment to build a monument to art’’ (Art vs Art,
1993, p. 63). Without the wherewithal to reverse or
forestall the direction of cultural policy, Janadas resorts
to ideological attack on the state, claiming that as a
monument, the Esplanade will be damning for the de-
velopment of the arts precisely because it is a monu-
ment, because
By definition, monuments commemorate the dead.
There is a kind of reciprocal structure: when you
go before a monument you not only commemorate
the dead, you are struck dumb. This is the general
eect of government intervention in the arts (Art
vs Art, 1995, p. 63).
Artistic space in Singapore is thus literally and
metaphorically debated and negotiated between the
state with its primarily cultural economic policy and
practitioners with their socially and culturally driven
agendas.
Where there is convergence between the state and
practitioners is in the area of community involvement in
the arts and in the goal of cultivating an interest in the
arts among Singaporeans. The NACÕs eorts outlined
earlier in the form of arts education and performances in
community spaces are reinforced by practitioners as
well. Hence, the Substation, as well as other groups such
as The Necessary Stage (a professional drama compa-
ny), have taken their works to housing estates, com-
munity centres, train stations and parks, as well as to
schools. The community interaction between performers
and people who would normally not be involved in the
arts is, to Sasitharan, a way of ‘‘opening up new spaces,
new horizons’’ (Personal interview, 15 May 1997), which
can only boost socio-cultural development.
5. Conclusions
The development of cultural economic policies as a
response to global economic restructuring is not a new
phenomenon. In the case of Singapore, the initial im-
petus and recognition of the value of cultural industries
came about because of a recession in the mid-1980s.
However, cultural industries did not constitute a major
part of the restructuring strategy. Instead, the immediate
post-recession recovery was driven primarily by strong
manufacturing growth, in large part because of the
economic recovery of the United States, reviving the
demand for electronic products and components (Ro-
dan, 1993, pp. 232–33). Indeed, for several years after
the Economic Committee recommendations, little con-
crete eort seemed to be put into developing cultural
industries. Subsequently, with the emergence of new
state discourses and rhetoric about the premium to be
placed on developing a gracious society that, inter alia,
brimmed with artistic vibrance, little public attention
was given to the notion of a cultural economy.
Yet, what I have illustrated is that, after a brief hi-
atus, the recommendations of the Economic Commit-
tee, and the larger implications of the value of the arts
and culture for the economy, have been noted seriously
by the state. From the highest level (no less than the
Minister for the Arts) to arts council sta, the view
holds that culture is no longer the by-product of an
economic surplus. The revival of this view in the 1990s
when it never fully took o in the 1980s must be con-
textualised. Although Singapore was no longer dealing
with a recession and was maintaining high economic
growth, the state was fully cognisant of the need for
diversification and the growing trend of globalisation,
in which capital and people cross borders frequently.
The state was also fully cognisant that its own popu-
lation and that of the region was becoming more af-
fluent (until the 1997 economic crisis), and would be
looking for new (including artistic) forms of leisure
activity. SingaporeÕs situation therefore does not mirror
that of many Western cities such as Bristol, Birming-
ham, Glasgow, Sheeld, Manchester and Liverpool
(see Bassett, 1993; Cohen et al., this issue) where cul-
tural industries are a crucial part of urban regeneration
strategies in a time of economic decline. Rather, while
the impetus stemmed from a time of economic reces-
sion, the actual strategisation and implementation are
rooted in a time of economic expansion and globalisa-
tion, when competition to attract ‘‘global citizens’’ –
personnel with the requisite high technology skills – are
dependent, at least in part, on a lively urban setting,
with all the trappings of a modern city in its physical
and socio-cultural infrastructure. Indeed, as Landry and
Bianchini (1995, p. 4) point out, future competition
between cities is likely to be based on ‘‘the ability to
develop attractive images and symbols and project these
eectively’’.
The stateÕs readiness to seize the opportunity to
develop cultural industries is also further evidence of
its ideology of pragmatism and developmentalism.
While in the 1960s and 1970s, there was significant
caution in importing ‘‘western culture’’, there is greater
laxity in the 1990s. A generous interpretation of this
turn in demeanour is the greater confidence of a nation
in its own identity. At the same time, it is also possible
that the call of economic gains compensate some per-
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ceived dangers. This is the hegemony of the economic
in Singapore.
However, hegemony is never total. As I have illus-
trated, cultural practitioners are less concerned with
economic generation than with cultural regeneration,
more persuaded as they are by ‘‘community self-devel-
opment and self-expression’’ (Bassett, 1993, p. 1785). In
seeking to develop a Singapore idiom and an indigenous
voice in their cultural products, they endeavour to draw
from local cultural resources as well as to contribute to
community life, so much so that artistic and cultural
activities may become part of the warp and woof of
daily life, generating a pulse and rhythm in the city. The
cultural spaces that they seek are those in which ‘‘[a]rt,
artists and art-lovers mingle, muse and meditate’’, and
where there is room ‘‘for eloquent failures as for re-
sounding successes’’ (Artistic statement, T. Sasitharan,
http://www.substation.org.sg). Economic imperatives,
on the other hand, emphasise ‘‘growth and property
development and find expression in prestige projects and
place marketing’’ (Bassett, 1993, p. 1785). The trouble is
economic drive does not necessarily contribute to cul-
tural regeneration. There is a danger that urban cultural
entrepreneurialism will create a city in which economic
spectacle replaces cultural substance and ‘‘aesthetics
replaces ethics’’ (Harvey, 1989, p. 102). As Bianchini
(1993b, p. 212) argued, to be truly eective, cultural
policies should not be measured purely by income or
employment generated but should contribute towards
improvement in the quality of life, social cohesion and
community development. Cultural policy should con-
tribute to the development of cities as ‘‘cultural entities –
as places where people meet, talk, share ideas and de-
sires, and where identities and lifestyles are formed’’. In
that way, the arts can become a part of peopleÕs daily
lives, socially and economically. Only then can the arts
be a part of the wider community rather than an
appendage to it (Wynne, 1992, p. x). This, Wynne (1992,
p. x) argues, will make the arts a true investment, pro-
viding both economic returns and quality of life.
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